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CISC CONTROLS AND THE 
UNION/NON-UNION WAGE RATIO 
David Shulenburger, Robert A. McLean, Sara B. Rasch 1 
Introduction 
The late 1960's witnessed relatively high rates of change in 
the hourly wages of craftsmen in the contract construction indus- 
tries. The belief that these increases in construction costs were 
passed on to other sectors of the economy and were, thus, a 
driving force in the inflationary process led to several efforts to 
contain construction wages. The first of these was the formation 
of the Construction Industry Collective Bargaining Commission 
(CICBC). Composed of labor and management representatives, the 
CICBC met periodically during the era of wage-price guidelines 
and served as a forum for discussion of wage moderation. 
In 1971, the CICBC was replaced by the Construction Indus- 
try Stabilization Committee (CISC), empowered by executive 
order to review all negotiated wage agreements in the construction 
industries and to disallow those that were deemed excessive. An 
important question is whether negotiated settlements were indeed 
moderated by the CISC. Our goal in this paper is to investigate 
that question, focusing on whether union/non-union wage ratios 
were different during the CISC period from what they would have 
been in the absence of controls. 
1David Shulenburger and Robert  McLean are professor and associate professor 
respectively in the School of  Business at the University of  Kansas. Sara B. Rasch is an 
assistant professor at Memphis  State University. 
The research reported here was supported by the Office of  Construction Industry 
Servicc~, U.S. Depai tment  of  Labor. Hugh Conway and Tom Mobley of  that office were 
especially helpful. Conclusions drawn and opinions expressed are those of  the authors  
and 6o not represent the position of  the U.S. Department  of  Labor or any of  its officials. 
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One might believe that negotiated wage settlements were 
easier to control than non-union wages because of their greater 
visibility and of the difusion of decision making in the non-union 
construction industry. If that were the case, the union/non-union 
wage differential would have been depressed by CISC controls. 
We found, however, the opposite to be true. While we urge caution 
in interpreting our results, our simulation suggests that unioni- 
zation served to shelter union construction craftsmen from the full 
effects of wage controls. 
Sources of  Variation in the Wage Ratio 
One cannot know for certain what the union/non-union wage 
ratio would have been during 1971-74 had the CISC controls not 
obtained. One can, however, derive an estimate of those unobserv- 
able ratios by examining the determinants of the union/non-union 
wage ratio for the post-control period. 
Following Rosen [1969] and Welch [1980], we specified 
and estimated an equation to account for the variation in the ratio 
of union to non-union wages. Rosen and Welch found the propor- 
tion of the relevant labor force unionized to be a major factor in 
determining that ratio. Indeed, to the extent that proportion is 
inversely related to the availability of non-union substitutes for 
union labor, its inclusion is demanded by the Marshall-Hicks 
[1927, 1963] analysis of union bargaining power. We also 
included the square of the degree of unionization and the rate of 
change of the degree of unionization in our estimating equation. 
We anticipated that the coefficient on the degree of unionization 
and its rate of change would be positive and that the coefficient 
of the degree of unionism squared would be negative. 
While Welch included a set of dichotomous variables (one for 
each city in his sample) to account for inter-metropolitan differ- 
ences in economic conditions, we specified a set of independent 
variables to represent market conditions directly. These were: 
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percent change in the volume of construction activity over the pre- 
vious year, (from F. W. Dodge construction data) a measure of 
the demand for labor in the construction labor market; the general 
unemployment  rate, a measure of excess supply of labor; and 
average manufacturing wages divided by average construction 
wages, to represent the incentive for labor to flow from the 
unorganized segment of the construction labor market to the 
manufacturing labor market. We anticipated that the coefficient 
of the change in the volume of construction activity would be 
greater than zero, that the general unemployment  ra tewould  be 
greater than zero (greater employment depressing wage levels in 
the unorganized sector to a greater extent than in the organized 
sector), and that of the manufacturing/craft wage ratio would be 
negative (non-union construction wages being related to manufac- 
turing wages to a greater extent than are union wages). 
We also recognized the role of non-market factors in the 
wage-setting process. Specifically, we included two variables to 
account for changes in the structure of collective bargaining. The 
first of these was a dichotomous variable taking the value of one 
for those localities in which construction trades engaged in coali- 
tion or coordinated bargaining (Cullen and Feinberg 1980). 
Related research by the authors indicated that the presence of 
coordinated bargaining may have significant influences on the 
ability of unions to win wage concessions (see Shulenburger, 
McLean and Rasch, 1981). Further, the separate crafts involved 
in construction exhibit different union/non-union wage differen- 
tials. These differences reflect differentially great abilities to 
balkanize labor markets, and differentially great importances of 
union-sponsored training in the wage determination process. The 
coefficients estimated for these craft dummies, then, represent 
differentials in the dependent variable for the craft indicated 
relative to the omitted craft, carpenters. 
The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the ratio 
of union to non-union wages in contract construction. Each obser- 
vation is a single craft within a metropolitan area. Data on area 
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market  conditions are derived from local economic conditions. 
The dependent  variable requires further discussion. As was 
true for the estimates derived by Welch [1980] ,  we were limited 
by availability of data in our derivation of the union/non-union  
wage ratio. Our measure of the wage, in both the union and non- 
union cases is the hourly direct wage rate, omit t ing all fringe 
benefits. For the union case, these data were provided by the 
Office of Construct ion Industry Services, f rom its records of 
negotiated settlements. For the non-union case, we were limited 
to data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' special surveys of 
construct ion wages conducted  in 1972, 1973, 1976, and 1977. 
Ideally, the "wage" ratio should include fringe benefits in 
both  its numerator  and its denominator .  This is not  possible, due 
to the nature of  the B.L.S. data. As Welch [1980, p. 156] argues, 
fringe benefits are highly correlated with the level of money 
wages. Thus, the omission of fringe benefits should generate no 
significant bias in the wage ratio employed.  
The estimating equation specified, then,  is of the following 
form: 
(1) lnWij= c o ClUij + c2U2ij + c 3 (%AU)ij + c4V j + c5R j + 
c6Mij + c7Bij + c8C + . . .  + cnC + eij; 
where 
lnW - -  natural log of  union + non-union craft wages 
U - -  percent unionized 
V - -  percent  change in the volume of construction 
activity since the previous year 
%AU - - -  1973-1977 percent  change in the proport ion 
unionized 
R - -  general unemploymen t  rate 
M - -  average manufacturing wages divided by craft wages 
B - -  d u m m y  variable for coordinated bargaining partici- 
pation 
C - -  craft union d u m m y  variables 
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Table 1 lists the estimates of the parameters of the determi- 
nants of the union/non-union wage ratio for the four years for 
which B.L.S. special survey data are available. A detailed discus- 
sion of these estimates and of  the differences between our 
estimates and those of  Welch [1980] can be found in Shulenbur- 
ger, McLean, and Rasch [1981]. For the purpose of  this discus- 
sion, we note only the differences among the four sets of estimates 
in the number of  observations on which the estimates were based. 
While the equation estimated for 1976 may appear to be the 
best of the lot for evaluating the effect of CISC controls of  the 
wage ratio, we are reluctant to use it for that purpose. Only thirty 
observations were available for that year. Thus, the estimates are 
based on only twelve degrees of freedom. We have based our 
analysis on the 1977 estimates, and have compared our results 
against a similar analysis with the 1972 and 1973 results. 
Simulating the Effect of CISC Controls 
Our 1977 coefficients for the determinants of the union/non- 
union wage ratio provide an estimate of what that ratio would 
have been in the absence of controls in 1972 and 1973 (after 
substituting the 1972 and 1973 values of the independent 
variables). Thus, we can simulate the effect of controls on the 
wage ratio. Table 2 reports the results of that simulation. As 
shown by the first row of the table, the 1977 equation (with 1977 
values substituted for the independent variables) predicts the 1977 
value of the mean union/non-union wage ratio quite well. When 
1972 and 1973 values of the independent variables are substituted 
in the 1977 equation, however, it underpredicts the actual mean 
wage ratios by a large percentage. That is, the relationships which 
explain the 1977 wage ratio suggests that, given conditions prevail- 
ing in 1972, the mean ratio of union to non-union wage in the 
construction sample would have been 16.7 percent lower than it 
actually was in 1972. 
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TABLE I 
Llependcm Variable: Natural Log of  UnioniNon-Union 
WaIF Ratio 
Year 
Var l sb le  1972 1973 1976 1977 
Coordinated Bargain ing - .070  - . 045  .03b - . 027  
( 1 . 4 7 )  ( . 0 6 )  ( . 5 4 )  ( . 5 8 )  
Z Unionized .544 .339 .210 -. 501 
( .73 )  ( .65)  ( .55 )  ( 1 . 6 7 ) *  
' 1973-|977 Z (~anBe . . . . . . . . .  .501 
i. Unionized ( .82 )  
Hanufactur tn6 MaEe Rat io  .209 - . 568  -1 .0~5 - .021  
( . 59 )  ( 2 . 2 0 ) * *  ( $ . 0 3 ) * * *  ( .089)  
Percent Chart6 • in Volume - - -  .232 .072 .133 
of  C,ms t ruc t i on  ( 2 . 5 3 ) * *  (1.23)  ( L . 7 8 ) *  
Unemployment .015 - . 005  - . 016  .037 
( . 94 )  ( .36)  ( l . 1 0 )  ( 2 . 014 ) *  
S r l c k l a y e r s  - .301 - . 242  - . 024  - . 157  
( 2 . 0 4 2 ) * *  ( 3 . 2 4 ) * * *  ( .23 )  ( 2 . 0 2 ) * *  
Cement Haaons - . 3 5  .078 .13b .018 
( . 46 )  ( I . 2 7 )  ( I . 5 6 )  ( 2 . 5 8 ) * *  
E l e c t r t c i a n .  .35 .073 .172 .105 
( .$0 )  (1 .27)  ( 2 . 2 5 ) * *  ( 1 . 9 1 ) *  
[con Workers . . . .  .25A 
( 2 . 1 4 ) * *  
Laborers - . 076  .228 .396 .007 
( .80)  ( 3 . 1 6 ) * * *  ( 6 . 1 8 ) * *  ( I . 9 1 ) *  
Pa in te rs  . . . . .  ,198 - - -  
( 2 . 6 7 ) * *  
P l p e f i t t e r s  .052 .064 - . 062  .016 
( . 57 )  ( . 67 )  ( .77)  ( .10 )  
PLumber8 - . 050  .032 - .029  .016 
( .57 )  ( .56 )  ( .41 )  ( . 29 )  
gnofers . 054  ,038 - , 0 0 |  -.012 
( .36 )  ( . 6 4 )  ( .00 )  (1 .11)  
S h e e t  .~etal Workers  .043  .167 .Oh6 .119 
( . 47 )  ( 2 . 8 8 ) * * *  (.O7) ( 2 . 1 5 ) * *  
Constant . 216  .642  .909 .295 
~2 .18 .31 . 76  .42 
F 1 .83"  5 .84***  6 ,96***  3 .68***  
N ~8 98 30 6~ 
t - s t a t i s t i c s  are in  parenthesps. 
* s l l m i t t c m n t  a t  . 10 l eve l  
* * s £ 6 n l f l c a n t  a[  .05 l e v e l  
* * * s l g n l f t c a n t  a t  .01 l e v e l  
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To check this result, we substituted 1977 mean values for the 
independent variables in the 1972 and 1973 equations. The pre- 
dicting equations for the earlier years substantially overpredicted 
the wage ratio for the later year. The 1972 equation predicts that 
the 1977 wage ratio would have been 16.7 percent greater than it 
actually was, while the 1973 equation predicted a 17.3 percent 
higher wage ratio. 
There are, of course several interpretations of the results of 
this simulation. There may have been some change in the relation- 
ship between union and non-union wages for which we have failed 
to account. Note however, that the major change in the construc- 
tion labor market, the decline in the percentage unionized, is well 
controlled in our model. 
The other interpretation of these results (the one that the 
authors favor) is that the control process itself was the factor 
accounting for differences between the structural relationships 
for 1972 and 1973 and that for 1977. If that were the case, then 
the effect of CISC controls was to "protect" union construction 
craftsmen from the wage moderating effects of the period of 
economic controls. 
Reid [1981] found the controls process to have had a signi- 
ficant (if inconsistent over time) effect on rates of change in aggre- 
gate wage levels. The results of our simulation suggest that 
non-union construction craftsmen shared in that aggregate wage 
moderation to a greater extent than did union construction crafts- 
m e n .  
Conclusions 
Claims of success have been made for the CISC. Mills [1980, 
p. 85], for example, stated, "During the major part of the pro- 
gram, (1972-73), wage and benefit increases negotiated in collec- 
tive bargaining agreements were substantially reduced." The 
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TABLE 2 
Simulation of Impact of Controls 
Year 
Predicted Mean Actual Mean Percent 
Wage Ratio Wage Ratio Difference 
1977 i. 409 i. 419 + • 7% 
1972 I. 282 I. 489 +16.7% 
1973 1.195 1.445 +17.3% 
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results reported here do not dispute Mills' claim directly. Rather, 
our simulation suggests that wage-price controls were more effec- 
tive in reducing construction increases outside the union sector 
than they were in moderating negotiated wage settlements. 
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